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As to the rrecise relation existing between the
directors of a corporation and the coryoration itself the
authorities would seem at first glance to be - great con-
fusion. They hold in varying degrees all the way from the
common law idea that directors are agents of the corporation
in its character as an artificial ideal entity, to the equi-
table theory that they are trustees of the corloration re-
garded as an aggre-ation of individuals. Thus a Conn. Court
sIYs -lainly that they are cgents and liable only to their
rrinciral, the corroration, for their acts. (26 Conn., 445)
Horton C. J. of Kansas says that they are p:r1.ary agents of
the corporation, and in reference to the corporation property
acts in the relation .f trustees. (21 Kas., 3G5). But the
prevailing doctrine undoubtedly is that the directors are
trustees of the corporation. In Robinson vs. Smith,(3 Paige
-2-
Ch., 222) it was held that the directors were jersoxally lLa-
ble as trustees, for loss occasioned by their fraud or neg-
ltZgence. The 7 izllsh rule is stated in one place as follows.
'He (the Iirector) is in ioint of fact, not merely a director,
but he also fills the character of trustee for the shareholder,
and he is, in regard to all matters entered into in their
behalf, to bc treated as an agent; therefore, there attaches
to the director for the benefit of the shareholders, all the
li.bilities and duties which attach to a trustee or agent.
Accordingly, if a director enters into a contract for the
comprany, he cannot derive any benefit from it." ('25 Bcav.,
586) In Law Rej., 0 Ch.Div., 322, it is said "They are the
managing partners of- the comrany, and if they abuse their pow-
ers, which they hold in trust for the c)-n:any, to the dam-
age of the company, for their own benefit, they are liable to
make good the breach of trust to their cesttis que trustent
like any other trustee.,-'  rout TMr. Miorawetz in Vol. I.,
sec. 516, says "It Is clear that the directors or managing
agents of a corporation are not trustees in a technical sense,
although they are often called trustees in practice; they
are merely agents, invested -ith wide discretionary powers in
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the management of the company's business. The relation be-
tween the directors of a corporation arnd the company itself,
is, however, in many respects a fiduciary or trust elation.
Whenever an agent is vested. with authority to use any dis-
creticn in the use of the powers conferr d upon him, it is an
implied condition that this discretion shall be used in good
faith for the benefit of the :rincipai, and in accordance
with the true purpose of the agent's appointment. To this
extent, every agency which is not a purely ministerial one
involves a fiduciary relation between the parties." Prof.
Pomeroy in 3 Po. Eq.Jur., sec. 1089, -ives what seems to be
a very terse and accurate stateient of this relation,in
ST
these wor,'s:- 'The directors and supreme managing offices of
corporations are constantly spoken of as trustees. They
are not, however, true trustees with the corporation or the
stockholders as their cestui que trustent, since they hold
neither t.e legal title to the corporate pro:-erty nor that to
the stock.. in fact directors are clothed -t the same time
with a double capacity, that of quasi tf'ustecs and that of
agents. It is of the utmost inpyortance to discriminate ex-
actly between these two characters, and to determine accurate-
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ly, for whom, over what subject matter ai-d to what extent
they are thus trustees; for 11:uonr this trust relation primar-
ily delend the equitable remedVa5which mn,' be obtained against
them by the corporation or by the stockholders. From thei
function af agency are derived their overs to act for the
corporation as a legal entity; it measures the extent of thee
powers in the :nanagement of both the external and internaal
affairs; it fixes the rights and obligations of the corpor-
ation in dealings with stockholders and with third rersons.
The rights, duties, liabilities and remedies which results
from the directors agency are therefore legal;the equitabLe
rights, 'u ies and remedlies are mainly referable to the
the trust element of the director's functions." Judge Shars-
wood of Penn. says in Sperin-i's Apr., 71 Penn.;t., 11, "It
is by no means a well settled joint what is the precise re-
lation which directors sustain to stockhold.e-s. They are
undoubtedly said by many authorities to be trustees, but
that as I ar~rehend, is oniY in a general sense, as we term
an agent or any bailee entrusted with the care and manage-
ment of the ,ror erty of another. It is certain that they
are not technical trustees. They can only be regarded as
nmandator :,s -- p rsons who have -ratuitously undertahing to
perform certiin duties, and who are, there-fore, bound to ap-
ply ordinary shill and diligence,and no more." He goes on
to say that zince they are themselves stoclholders, the pre-
sumption is that, interester as they are in the success of
the business, they will bring their best judgment and skill to
bear upon the duties of their office. Further, that since
they are asked by the stockho'ders to thus serve without
compeneation, they should not be so strictly judged as should
an agent or trustee of a lrivate estate, and that for mere
mistakes of judgieut they should not be responsible, pro-
vided the mistahes ;ere honest and fairly within the scope
of the powers and discretion confided t: the managing body,
even th:ugh they were so gross as to appear to others absurd
and rediculous. 13ut Jud-e Earl in Hun vs. Cary, 82 N.Y., 65,
Probably voices the consensus of authorities when he says,
regarding Judgc Sharswood's opinion just given, "As I under-
stand this language, I cannot assent as properly defining to
any extent the nature of a firector's res-onsibility. Like
a mandoatory, to which he has been likoned, he is bound not
only to exercise proper ca .e and diliZonce, but ordinary skill
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and judgment. As he is bound to exorcise ordinary skill and
jud7mmnt he cannot set up that he did not possess them.
When damage is caused by -is want of judgment, he cannot ex-
cuse himself by alleging 'is gross i-norance. One who vol-
untarily takes the -osition Df director, and invites confi-
dence in that relation, undort,-tes, like a mandatory, with
those who he represents or for whom he acts, that he possesses
at least ordinary :nowledge and skill, and that he will bring
them to bear in the fischarge of his duties. (Story on
Bailments, sec. 182a)." In Hun vs. Cary, which was @n ac-
tion brou-ht by a receiver of a savings bank against the
trustees, for alleged reckless extravagance in the use of
the funds, it was held that the relation between the savings6,1
and its trustees or directors is that of principal and agent
and that between the trustees and depositors is similar to
that of trustee and cestui que trust.
In regard to t" relAtlon cexisting between the di-
rectors arJd sh areholders, differenut opinions are rel-orted,
but the yrevai-in- '! ctrine is -robably that the directors
a-e trustees for all the shareholders. Their fiduciary re-
lation is limited to cases in which the action of the directors
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has affected the whole body of the shareholders; and when
only shareholder was affected, there was held to be no trust
relation between the parties. (15 Am.Rep., 245) Shaw C.J.
in 12 Metc. , 371, says:- "There is no legal -rivity, rela-
tion, or irnnediate connection, between the holders of shares
in a bank, in their individual cala-ity, on the one side, and
the directors or the other. The directors are not the bOLl-
ees, factors, agents or trustees of such individual stock-
holders." Robertson J. of the I.Y.Sup.Ct., (10 Bosw., 391)
describes the relation of directors to sh reholders as re-
sembling a bailment. lie says:- "There -May be a confidential
betveen
relation subsisting a stockholder and a director, creating
a certain duty by the latter to the former, or certain rights
in the former which give the former a right to prevent, or
sue for, the malfeasance of the latter. But I think it will
be found that neither'trustee'not'agent' expreeses such re-
lation, and that bailee of the capital of the corporation to
pdform specific duties therewith comes :.uch more near to it."
He also holds that in order to sue the directors for damage
done by their acts, a stock'holdcr may not sue alone bift must
make the corporation a aty to the action. Equity, however,
-a-
has modified this rule so that ii the cxroratiDn Will not
call to account officers who have either fraudulently or neg-
ligently exceeded their authority or if the corporation is
under the control of those sought to be made rarties defendant
the etocdholdors who are te real rarties in i-Cterest may file
a bill in their own nanes >ahing the corporation a rarty de-
fendant; or a 1art of them may file a bill i", behalf of them-
selves and all others staniing in t e same relation, if con-
venience requires it( (Peabody vs. 7'lint, G Allen, 50) In
this case it v.8 hold that the directo-s are trustees for
the cor'oration and that t cre oro-ation is itself a trustee
for the stockL.olders.
Upon a careful exazaination of all the authorities
uron this subject, it vill be found that althou-1h they seem
to bd in conflict, they all have one thing in comuon. There
can be no doubt that the directors of a corporation act in a
fiduciary cayacity, or that their -.uties and liabilities are
those of fiduciaries. There is no disagreement as to the
measure of their duties and liabilities, or as to the standard
by which their liability is measured. The -nly difference is
as to who stand in such relation to them as to be able to en-
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force such liobillty. It is -rou-bly true that, strictly
speai "an, the o-0:7 Iiret . ivity is bctw:eCn the directors,
and the corroration as an crtificial entity, and that the
dircctors are trustees for the cor-oration only. Lut it can
not be questionei, in the light of the authorities that the
shareo.ler '71ve such interest in the enforcement of the
trust, that they may in certain cases bring suit for that pur-
pose directly against delinquent directors.
Coming nov. to the relat-on between direcior and
creditors, we find the rules heretofore stated not always ap-
plicable. To the extent of croditor's interests, corporate
funds are held in t-ust for creditors as well as for share-
holders. Consequently, directors -aving in their charge
funds on which creditors have valid claims and equitable
liens, but in the management o!- Thich creditors have ordinarL-
ly no voice, occupy a position of trust towards the creditors
as well as toviardhs the siareholders; and owe it to creditors
to protect their interests, as they owd it to shareholders to
protect the interests of the latter. The only claim of
creditors iuof course, to be paid the amount due them, and
their main right A that the corporate funds shall not be
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recklessly mism-magod, or diverted from their true purpose.
And directors naturally owe it to creditors to heei the cor-
roration solvent, anhC to u-e the funds in furtherance of the
regular business. And, accordingly, directors will be liable
to the :ersons for whom they hIold corporate finds in trust,
in vwhich ,uyfber creditors are included, if they either by
fraud or neglig.ence comit a breace of the trust confided to
them.- In the absonce of gross fault or negligence, however,
they are liable only to the exteit of the capital stock and
corrorate assets.
In considering the b-owers of' directors, we find
three zenrA:l rules laid coy, for their -overrLment, or more
strictly speahing, one gener 1 rule and two limitations there-
on.
The first rule as to the ext nt of the Iovira con-
ferred by "authority to manage the business of the corpor-
ation" is that such povwer extends to the doing of any ordinary
act conducive to the succeos or deuaned by the exigencies
of the business; and since any :Lerson acting in a fiduciary
capacity must necessarily exercise an honest discretion and
under certain circumsta-ces may do acts which at other times
would be in violation of his trust, so directors,may, in crit-
ical emergencies do acts which would be unauthorized under
ordinary circmmst a1ces.
The second ruse is that aut-_crity to manage the
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affairs of a corporat~on does not authorize the directors to
change the scheme of the corp:rate enterprise or the nature
of the corporate busincss; nor does it authorize them to
bring the business to a conclusion either directly, or in-
directly thought acts which would render t-ie continuation
of the business as planned impossible.
The third rule is that since the constitution and
ail auth:rity thereby confcrre., relate to a specific enter-
prise and corporate purpose, no authority is conferred on
directors to bin. the corporation in regard to matters having
no connection with the objects of incorporation.
Turning back to the first rule the question at once
arises--ilow is the score of the term ordinary act within the
corporate powers to be determined? It would hardly be
limited to routine -r clerical or ministerial business, but
would seem to have a more comprehensive meaning, Comstock
J. of' New York Court of Appcals, in construing the term"or-
dinary busine~ss which a by-lhn empowe-ed a quorum composed
of less than a majority of directors to transact said in
19 :.Y., 206-17:-- "The oriinary business of the corporation
had, I think, no limit short of the varied and extensive af-
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fairs in which it 7as author ized by its charter to engage.
It could construct and op6rate a canal, deal in stocks and
trusts, and it could cayry on the businerss of bankinzg in all
its de~artmcnts. If the due execution of these powers aid
not constitute the ordinary business of the company then it
seems to ue irzMossible to suggest any definition of the term,
and the by-law becomes senseless and unrmeaningless, and if
these express powers of the corporation were embraced in the
terms of the by-law, it must necessarily follow that the
quorum designated took all the incident-.l authority which
the whole board .:ould poseess in the execution of the same
powers. In the operation of banhing, which constituted one
pDrtion of the ordinary business it night become necessary
to borrow money, and the power to do so existed. As debts
could be contracted the incidental power of raying them can
not be do-ibted, go, the condition of the company's affairs
might requir a negotiation with creditors, and the postponment
and securing of their demands. To secure a debt, and procure
its forbearance in a period. of embarassment, would not by any
means be an extraordinary act, in the sense of the by-law,
although it might be unusual in the magnitude and importance
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of the transaction.,"
Accordingly all business in furtherance of the cor-
pc--ate enterprise and not involving any departure therefrom,
may be transacted by the directors. They have full auth-
o rityuniless restrained by the charter or by-laws to do any-
thing the corporation may do. In fact the board of directors
is frequently tdrmed the corporation, and in te case of
savings banks, for instance, this designation would seem to
be entirely -proper. ITUnder the second general rule that JP
directors cannot change the scheme of the corporate enterprise
nor bring the business to a conclusion there are four things
directors cannot do.
First:- they cannot change the nature or plan of the
corporate business, nor in the absence of special authority
can they accept from the legislature any radical alteration
or amendment in the corporate constitution. But a statute
facilitating the exercise of franchises already enjoyed is
not view~in the light of a substantial change in the consti-
tut ion.
Second:- directors may not increase or decrease the
capital stock of the corporation. Justice Bradley in 18
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Wall. , 233-4, says, in this coni-ection:-' "A change so organic
and fundamental av that of incr,,a7irn- the calitai stock of a
corporation beyond the limits fixed by the uharter cannot be
made by t.e directors alone, unless expressly authorized so to
do. The general 1oer to Terform all corporate acts refers
to the ordinary business transactions of the corporation, ard
does not extend' to a reconstruction of the body itself, as
to a:: enlargement of its capital stock." These
of course, rest entirely with the shareholders.
Third:- dircctor-s cannot t-ansfer corporate property
which is necessary to the continuance of the corporate busi-
ness. Such a sale is void as against non-assenting stock-
holders'. But if the stockZholders having -otice, are silent
and a.ke no objection whatevc, by their acquiescence they
will be taken as assenting. (103 Penn.St., 546) So the
directors Df a corToraticn have no -,!ov e' to give away its
funds, or deirive it of D-.y of the nc -ns of accomplishing the
purroses for which it w chartered. (43 Pa. St., 29, 37)
But it has been held that directors have rower to apply 1500
pounds out of the w' ivided :rofits of a manufacturing com-
pany, as a gratuity of one week's extra p .y to each employee
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who had worked with a good character throughout the year.
(4E L.J.Eq., 437) This doctrine has, however, not met with
favor in the United States.
Fourth:- if 7irectors hve no power to sell cor-
porate -roiperty u, hich is essential to the continuance of' the
business, they certainly have no right to vini up the
affairs of the corporation, such right residing solely in the
body of the share-holders. But it has been held that the
directors acting in -ood fait have the rie
x" LD- hv he n-t to make an as-
sigrnent for the benofit of creditcrc, not only wothout ask-
ing permission of the shareholdors but against their expressed
17i 1. (91 11o. , -10) (01 :,o. , 1307)
The last of the three general rules herein before
menitioned is that the r.irctors have no authority to bind
the co)rporation in rfatte-'s riot relating to the corporate
business. On the face of it this u:ould seer to be self-
evident. The powers enjoyed by the 'Lireotors whether con-
ferred by the constitution on by a vote of the shareholders,
have their ultimate basis in the corporate constitution, and
in the agreement embodie9 therein. Therefore the diredtors
have no power to do any act outside the limits authorized by
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the charter or by-lawzs, and since t'me charter and agreement
relate only to the corporate enterprise aw y acts having no re-
lation to the corrorate enterprise must be beyond the author-
ity of the directors. AccordIingly the directors have no
authority to give the note of the corporation for a debt
having no relation to its business, due to tho payee of the
note; and such a note will be void in the hands of' persons
having notice of the circim-stanccs under whi-h it was giving.
But, on the other hand, if the direltors acting -.ithin the
arparent scope of their authority, commit a breach of their
trust, the rights of an innocent -person dealing with them
will not be affected thereby. Thus, if directorc , having
due authority, borrow money for the corporalion the lender
is not bound to sec that the money is used for the further-
ance of the company's business and not used for purposes ultra
viresthe corporation or embezzled by the directors. (20
wlly. Rcp., 254)
Acts of directors relative to matters in which they
have no authority may be null and void at the discretion of
the stoohh nolders although if the acts are -ot contrary to
law they may subscquently be ratifie1 by the stockholders and
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take effect ffnm the date of ratification. Ratification may
be either expres- or imlied, and in r;eeral the evidence
thereof _must be of as high a nature as would have been re-
quired to show 7,rior authority. And mIroreover any delay on
the part of the principal in repudiating the acts of his
agent, by which the latter haq ovorste-red his authority,
makes the acts his own. (69 Pa.1St., 426 cases cited)
As to what -ortion of their authority directors may delegate
to some of their own nunnber or to other officers, 7o more
definite rule can be given than that they ca,7ot delegate
authority wich it was intended that they as a bourd should
exercise. Thus while they cannot delegate authority to do
acts involving per-onal skill and discretion, still they may
delegate authority to do merely ministerial acts. This, to ,E
sure, is rather an exercise J ian a delegation of their author-
ity since it is not intended that lirectors should :-erform
the duties of subordinate of icor. They may, of course,
regulate the authority of those xc.om they appoint, and thus
they may authorize the president, or president and cashier,
or the general agent, to borrow money and draw and endorse
negotiable paper in the name of the corporation: (12 S.& R.,
256) or may authorize a treasurer to sign mortg-ages belonging
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to the coryoration. ( 137 Mass., 41) Pfrs involving a
wider dipcretio2i than mayv saf(!iy be cntru tec to a sin-le of-
fieer may be 6Thiojatc( 1:, director to a eoui'1itt-e of their
'1~Ler the boCarrl, of (~il c(.'C 'nc be v% f 3 Ar in L~
. Y., C207, a io 2. :f tuo:t'-th 'e ircr Ior s :;- aiove- 1o
'elegate c.2.ori~'. to a. 'Nlc-U, to .ct all ordinary busi-
ness. They may delegate -authority to a comittee of their
ovrn niuaber to alienate or riortgage real estate, or may author.
ize one of their number to sign any securities belonging to
the company. And on the other hand there are decisions hold-
ing that directors cannot delegate their authority. to allot
sharesto make calls, to declare dividends, or to order a
sale of shares for the non-payrnent of assessments. r De
facto officers are those whose acts although not those of
lawful officers, the law, upon p-rinciywes of policy and jus-
tice, will hold valid as regards the interests of the public
and third pa'ties, where the duties of the office were ex-
ercised: First without a known appointment or election,
but under such circiunstances of reputation or acquiescence
as would lead persons to de.l with them sulposing them to be
regularly elected officers.
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Second, undor color of a re.,ular election ,'_r appoint
ment, but where the officers had failed to conform with some
requirment or condition -frecedent, such as taking an oath
or filing - bond.
Third, under color or an election 7:1-ich woa void be-
cause of the officer not being eligible, or on account of
a t of .-o.-er in the electing bo -- _, or by reason of some
irreoularity in its exercise, the defect, of whatever nature.
being unknown to the publi.
..rt, unde- color of an election or a?::ointment
made in ur'._suencc of an unconstitutional i-a. , before the
same is adjudged to be such. (38 Conn., 449)
A de jure off icc)r i one w-ho has the lawful right
to an office, even though hAe may have been ousted from it or
has nevcr actually t kea possession of it. An officer do
facto must be actually in posses'sion of the office and have
it under his control, And it folozs that two ::,_r-sons can-
not be de facto officer for the sascne office at the same time.
The contracts of de facto of ric-er 7 'ting wi'hin the srhere
of their office, are bi 'ding uiron the corroration. A direc-
tor do facto cannot avoid a Iiability by settin,- 'mT that he
-21-
was not a do jure director, (2 Raile, 139); nor collect a
salary as a do facto officer. (7 S.&. R., 38) He miay be
ousted only by a quo warranto 71oceeding and not by a suit
in equity nor by an action iin tresI:aass.
Director-) of a cor-oratimi, may b-' a brecch of
their official duties become personally liiable to the cor-
poration or its representatives, or to a part or all of the
stockholders, or to third persons ur creditors havinl dealings
with the company. This liability me y arise uder an express
statute or it may exist independently of any statute. in
the former case, the statute defines t liabi -ity and points
out the manner of enforcing it. In the latter case, the
question as to when this liability ariFcos n' who may en-
force it, and the maner in zhich it is to be c.forced can
only be solved by a clear conccrtion of the relations ex-
isting between the directlrs and the corporation, shareholders
and creditors. in the orenlg. chater the status of directors
with regard to all of these was briefly outlined, and it was
found that they have a two-fold character, that of agents and
trustees . It r-n th-t the liabilty of an agent, is
briefly this: For -ion-feacance, or for non-execution of the
duties of his agency, he is liable only to his j-,. ifiipal or
some one claiming trouh his oriicii. T  m sfeasance
or wrongs done in the course of his agency, whether within
or witqout the score of his authDrity, he is liable to the per-
son 4ured, whether such person be his :,rincipal or a stranger.
It is plain that the company itself has a remedy against its
directors for negligence, fraud, breaches of trust, or acts
dont in excess of their authority, either at law or in equity,
according to the nature of the wrong done. For acts of
fraud or misfeasance, done by directors, vwhe-eby shareholders
are injured, the latter have an action at law, on -recisely
the same grounds as othc_r strangers 7onld have. Shareholders
also have a remedy against directors for breaches of trust
committed by the latter where the corporation refuses to pur-
sue for the shareholder, the prove. remedy. Etranger have
any appropriate r(medy against the directors of the corpor-
atiol which one man may ordinarily have against another in
the ordinary relations ol civil society, not resting in con-
tract. In cases arising from wrongful acts, each is liable
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for all the consequences. There is no contribution between
them, and it is unnecepsary, thercfore, to mahe all the di-
rectors parties defendant, vhether tley have joined in the
wrongful act or nat. Following the rule sf agency that a
princi: L and agent --ay be jointly ii :ble for acts of mis-
feasance committet- b'y the agent in the course of the business
of his agency, it has been held that a corporation and its
directors may be liable in equity a-d rossiaiV at la -,, for a
wrongful act of the directors. But it would be an action
ex-contractu: an action at law will not lie -'S2.Inst a corpor-
ation for deceit. Directors are not liable for the frauds
of subordinate officers aUyycolnted by them unless they author-
ized the wrong or in some 1,:y shared in it, since the agents
alth:ulh arpointed by the directors are agents of the corpor-
ation,a.and the doctrine of resr ndeat sucrior a:: lies rather
to the corporation than to the directors. if the interme-
diate agent has bc Zuilty of neglitrence in -Cf:-ointing unfit
subordinate agents, he is liable .ly 6o hi.s principal for
the breach of duty. Directors, however, may under certain
circumstances beco-e liable for the frauds of their agents,
even though they r"id not 'now of thecm at the time they were
comuitted. This vrili h-iaon -h--Ae thc o i?-ctors ,er-sonally
and knowingly derived a bonefit from the fraud. Here the
slibordinate a-ents vho co->J-itte( the fraud become in a
sense the agents of t e directors.
The -eneral hoic to iich the liability of directors
to the corroration is refer-c-:d is that of b-reach of trust.
This brebc- may consist of:--
I. Fraud or mal- 2 eoasance,
II. Of neg-igencc or non-feasance,
III. Of acts ultra vires.
In examining into the fraud of directors, we find
one rcrinciple underlying all their acts: viz, that the
directors of a corporation sustain towar-f its members the
relation of trusteos arnn cestuis que trustents, and in every
transaction in their capacity as directors the utmost good
faith is e'sevItial. 'Te have seen t'.at for me-e mistakes of
judg ient they are not necess?.rily liable, but for all frauds
they are held strictly to 3ount. One of the most fo-iliar
doctrines of equity is that a trustee will under no eircum-
stances be permitted, without the Uriorlodge or consent of his
pri-ciTal to sycculate ot of his t-rust or to retain any profit
-2(3-
that may have accrued to him Tersonally, but he must
account to his cestui que trust for all profits he may have
made out of the trust relation. r-,iS rule awil vrith full
force to directors of corporations. (58 Pa.St., 120) It
does not nceoss arily mon that they arc precludod from making
any profit -vhatever ut of their trust relation, but that they
muist inae ,.o secret -rofit out of it. The body of the
corporation may, after learning all the circtunstances, allow
them to make a p-rofit .),t of the t-ansaction, or after the
transaction is comrlcteC, m y ratify any acts dcne by them
and will thereafter be estopped from repudiating such acts.
A cormon forn of uahin' secret -,_-fits is to receive a bribe
in one form or another. Thus the directors of a rail-road
may derive benefit from causin it to run through a certain
town or section of the country. It is a quection wnvethor
they -are t men trustees in iq'ity of thu fund t us receive or
whether they are guilty of a breach of their trust, but it
has been held' (in 0 Pa.St., 202) that the cororation may
proceed a ainst them either at 1w:: or in equity for the breach
of the trust.
Another form of fraud practiced by directors is
-27-
seen in c-onstruction compa-ies, it sometimes happens that
a director of a rail-road cormi-::y is a director in a R.R.
construction coi-.a may and he, :r they if t er are -_ore than
one of them, so manage the rail-road' s affairvc that the
construction conrnyany is av:arfled the ccntract for builing
the road or rortions of it. It is c iear that one man cannot
servo tvio masters rhose interests a-re conflicting, and courts
of equity usually pronounce such contracts illegal or invalid.
Then, too, sales by the directors to thIe corporatioii or vice
versa, are voidable at the oytion of the stochh:olcrs al-
though not necessarily void. (60 Pa.SCt., 291) There is
nothing to yrevent sale- of tVis h.ind, articulariy where the
corroration is rt'l resented by an-other agent wine transacts this
particular business anc! where sood faith governs both par-
ties. But the burden is always on t-Le directors to show the
rurity of their intentions.
So where directors vote themselves salaries, or an
increase over those sjlaries allowcd then by the shareholders,
a court of equity will interfo'e in behalf of the shDIrehoi-
tiers. Althoug"' rirc,.tors .f a o. voting- ext"a eomrer-
sation to one of their :.iimber for extr-'a services as agent of
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the bank, are not liable thereforo if th(-.y act in good faith
and for the benefit of the corporation, althoigh t-e extra
co"irensation is illegal and --ay be recovered back by the
company from the director receiving it. (ii Ala., 191)
There are some other acts which are voidable
but not absolutoly void, the burden being alyt, cys on the
directors to show the fairness of the transactions. Such
are contra-ts between corpor.tions having directors in common.
Also in the cases of directors purchasing pr:perty for
the corporation or buying uir corporate debts. But directors
guilty of sIeculating with corporate funds, or of cancelling
subscriptions of particular directors or shareholders, or
allotting shares to infant children are hold por sonally lia-
ble to the corporation.
With res- ect to the liibility for negligence of the
directors to the corporation we must recur for the solution
of any problems v.hich may arise to the doctrine governing the
liability of agents and mandatories. This doctrine has been
framed into two rules which are generally acceptcd as author-
ity. They are:-- lst., "Vhere directors are clothed 'ith a
discretion, they are not responsible to the corporation for
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damages flowing from an exorcise of this discretion, however,
erroneous their exercise of it may have been.
2nd., in respect t5 their :inistorial duties, they are
not responsible to the corporation for anything short of
gross negligence, non-attendance and freuci, whereby frauds
have been perpetrated, or thie property of the corporation
emblezzled or wasted.
The d irectors of boanks from the nature of their
undertaking fall within the class of cases where only ordin-
ary care and diligence are required. It is not expected that
they should devote their vfhole time and attention to the in-
stitution in which they are acting, but other officers who
are duly compensated therefor, have t-ie immediate management.
They are, of course, un'er the control of the directors and
the doree of care necessary to be observed by the directors
is controlled by circumstances or custom. if there have
been no acts by the President or Cashier calculated1 to awaken
suspicion as to their fidelity, ordin!7ry care and diligence
is sufficient. But if the directors become acauainted with
any fact calculated to put prudent men on their guard, a
degree of care commensurate with the evil to be avoided is
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required, and a want of that care would certainly render them
liable.
Ultra Vires Acts. In considoring directors'
liability upon contractual engagements, the fundamental
princilloa of agency a-1ly. Thus it is laid down in the text
books that a rerson who entcrs into a cm;ntract as agent for
a disclosed T-- , and responsible -,rincipal, and within
his powors, is not liable urpon such contract. Further that
if such person contracting as agent exceeds his powers, tho
princiral is not bound, while he himself is liable, as he also
is if in reality he has no existing Iprinciral. lie must
clearly and unistakably both act and give the parties with
wlom he is dealing to ,ndcrsta-,d that 1-ie is acting as agent,
and is unwilling to incur any T ersonal liability. Otherwise
he will be hold as a rrincipal oven though ho had no such
intention. If he has ho rrincipal at the time and there is
not then in existence any person who could be -riyici-al, then,
as the contract would otherwise be wholly inoperative, such
person will be held to have acted in his ; n j oalf and he
e-rl)
cannot afterwards be kelieved from liability by the intpntion
of some person villing to ratify such contract.
-31-
So an agent of a corporation is liable where he
either expressly or imrnliefiy by his conduct misrepresents
the extent of his authority. This last is probably'the com-
monest instance where a -erson dealing with directors obtains
regress from them personally on the ground of the contract
being ultra vircs either of themselves or of the corporation.
The principle is as follows:-- "If a director or other off ic-
ial of a corporation -aking a contract with a person misrep-
resents 'is own authority, whereby a contr-act not enforcible
against the corporation is made, and the .erson so contracting
was niot aware of the limitation of authority, such person will
have a-" action for damages against the individual guilty of
the misrepresent ation; and it has been decidec that he will
have a similar action when the misrepresentation is of the
powers of the corporation;" the accuracy of this last clause
has, however, ben 7uestione,. Thus in Cherry vs. Bar!',
L.R.,3 P.C., 24, two of the directors of a company informed
a bank that they had aprointed "C" to be manager of the com-
pany, and had authorized him to draw checks. They had no
v :ere
authority so to do, but they held upon chechs drawn by "C"
upon the imylied warralty that they had the requisite author-
'2 '
ity. An agent will not be liable if the person with whom he
dealt knew or had the means of knowing that ho had exceeded
his authority. As to those matters wherein the powers,
either of the corporation or of the agent are fixed by public
act or by generkl laws, parties doeling with the agent have
the means of knowing and must be yrestmed to know the extent
of the power; and having thus constructive notice, cannot set
up that they were deceived by any implied representations or
warranty of rci:er in the corporatio- or of authority in the
agent. The mere fact that a director or other official
enters into a transaction in such capacity is no representa-
tion or v:waranty of his ovrn or of the corporate powers, or
that the corporation will carry out such transaction.
If the directors of a corporation do an act which
is clearly beyond the powers conferred upon them by the
charter or incorporating statute, and whereby lossess are sus-
tained by the company a court of equity will, in a proper
proceeding compel them to makc good such loss out of their
private estate. A provision in the charter of a bank, pro-
hibiting any director or other of-icer under a penalty of fine
or imprisonment, from borrowing any -rioney from t'e ba-r2 does
not release a director from liability to the bank for the
money thus loaned him. Such contract, though illegal, will
be enforced because its enforcement is not contrary to p.ublic
policy. but in conformity wit. it.
If direotors hnowingly issue illeg;.l and spurious
stock beyond that which they arc authorized by the charter to
issue, they are liable to any purchaser or subsequent trans-
feree of the certificates of obligations vho takes them re-
lying o their a7;r arent validity. But a director is not
liable for a breach of trust or act ultra vires or improvident
act committed by his ce-directors, 1;here he was not present
when it was de~ided won, took no part in it, and had no
knowledge of it, unless it a_-,ars that he igt have pre-
vented it by ordinary attention to 'is duties. (71 Pa.St.,
11) So also where a director was present e during only a
pi-rt of the sessicn at w.ich an illegal act was approved and
had no knowledge of the facts. But if he was -resent when
the act was decided upon, whereby te funds of the corporation
were wasted and did not eprose it, he will.liable.

